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Abstract: This papes discusses the changes that socialist 
countries, specially in Eastern Europe, are cur-
rently undergoing. It also comments on the 
decline all over the world of the institution of the 
nation-state, and, particularly, a decline in its • 
importance in the economy. 
I understand El Colegio de México is now celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. 
I bring you greetings from a sister institution, Stanford University, which is 
celebrating its one hundredth anniversary. So we can give you some guidance 
on your next 50 years, the troubles and the joys and successes of university 
education, and its contributions of students and research to the welfare of the 
world. 
As a preliminary to the discussion of the problems that the socialist 
countries are facing, I would like to make a general observation. We notice in 
Eastern Europe the changes from a state-controlled system to, well, we are not 
sure just to what, actually, but to something which greatly diminishes the power 
of the State in economic affairs. In Western Europe we are also seeing an 
evolution/an evolution toward a larger entity than the nation. In short, and I 
think this is a bold generalization but one that is supported by current trends, 
we are seeing a decline of the institution of the nation-state and, particularly, of 
its importance in the economy. The power of the State is necessarily decreasing 
with these changes; either it is giving way to supranational organizations, or to 
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more individual choice, to free enterprises, to market institutions in which the 
State, per se, wields less power than it did before. I am sure the State will not 
disappear completely. It will remain a significant enterprise, but it is clear that 
it no longer has the role it had in earlier periods. 
Now, the nation-state is a strange institution from the point of view of 
world history; it is not by any means the typical institution of the world. In 
particular, we have had a projection of European nationalities and national 
rivalries, economic and otherwise, on the rest of the world. In 1756, we find 
that two Native American groups in what is now the northeastern part of the 
United States, the Iroquoians and the Algonquins, were fighting with each 
other. At the same time, two armies in India, from Bengal and from the 
Carnatic coast, respectively, were at war. And why were they fighting? They 
were fighting because there was a rivalry between the King of Prussia and the 
Archduchess of Austria over the control of Silesia. Now, that is a rather 
striking example of interrelations. In this case, these were allies of the French 
and of the English, in both India and America. There was a projection, in other 
words, of national rivalries onto the world scene. I do not think this is one of 
the most beneficial aspects of European influence in the world. 
The development of nation-states in Europe went through several stages. 
The end of the Middle Ages saw the emergence of some countries in which the 
central authority was important: first Spain and England and then, slightly later, 
France, which became much more powerful for a long while than either of the 
others. These were strong states as opposed to the weak hierarchical states of the 
Middle Ages, but it took a while before they were in full trade with another spirit, 
the spirit of the nation. The idea of identifying a political entity with a national 
entity, with a sense of culture and language and shared history, is a relatively 
modern invention. To some extent the English and the Spanish, because of their 
relative geographical isolation, had it. But it took a while, and required a great 
deal of deliberate effort, to spread to the rest of Europe. Really, it was only with 
the French Revolution in France, and then its repercussions and imitations 
throughout Europe, that we saw the true development of the nation-states at the 
time Germany and Italy became states. 
This identification of the nation-state has far from disappeared. In fact, I 
think that one of the great difficulties in Eastern Europe is likely to be attempts 
to make national boundaries, in thecultural and linguistic sense, coincide with 
political and economic boundaries. I foresee a very considerable danger. I do 
have the optimistic view that over a long period of time this is gradually going 
to disintegrate, but the period between now and then may be quite painful. 
Europe is not particularly wicked, less so than many other parts of the 
world, but the rise of the European nations happened to coincide with the 
period in which the European nations were considerably more advanced, 
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was manifested in my country and your country and in Africa at a somewhat 
later date, has meant that there was a period of several hundred years in which 
the rivalries of Europe were played out on the world scene. Europe was never 
a unified place; among the divisions we had France versus Germany, for 
example. We also have had, in the last forty years, communism versus 
capitalism. I must say, I do rejoice in thinking that both of these divisions are 
disappearing and, with them, the capacity of Europe to create mischief for the 
rest of the world . 
In this context, let me turn to some remarks about the changes in the socialist 
States. I do not claim to be a country expert; rather, I am applying ideas of general 
economic theory to what I have observed and read in Eastern Europe, and 
particularly in the Soviet Union. When one talks to Soviet economists and, for 
that matter, reads the speeches of Soviet statesmen, Gorbachev's or anyone 
else's, there seems to be repeated agreement, virtual unanimity, as to what the 
goals of the present transformation are. They want "marketization" (that is an 
English derivative of the Russian word, whatever it may be) and privatization, 
and to accompany these, they put forward the ideas of macroeconomic balance 
and currency convertibility; these are supporting steps towards the two main 
aims of marketization and privatization. 
The official goal of the Soviet Union is to achieve an economy in which 
the proportion of the economic system that remains in public hands is the 
same as it is in Italy, .30 percent. Well, this is obviously a change in goals that 
is utterly fantastic. Seventy years of history had been poured into the effort to 
create a world in which there was no private ownership or, at best, it was 
tolerated in exceedingly marginal occupations. There were whole 
philosophies, there were whole commitments. These have been abandoned 
and, according to my impression of the Soviet experts, the socialist idea (by 
socialist idea I mean one in which public ownership is dominant) is dead as 
an ideal. Of course, if you go to the Soviet Union, you find that everything is 
still publicly owned. The question is then: How are these goals, about which 
there seems to be no public dispute, to be accomplished? Or, indeed, will they 
ever get there? I am not going to attempt to predict, I am just going to try to 
indicate some of the alternative forks in the road. If you want to be serious 
about this, we know that history is likely to have some very considerable 
surprises, and they are not necessarily pleasant ones. 
There is a general issue with all these steps, with marketization and 
privatization, even with convertibility; namely, that it is natural to think of 
them as taking place over time. If you contemplate the idea of turning over 
the publicly owned property to the private sector, you wonder how this could 
be done in a short period of time. Indeed, even under very favorable cir-
cumstances, when a country decides to privatize some parts of its national 
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Britain in recent years, that does not take place very quickly. Take any 
enterprise, like the telephone system; it takes several years of planning, very 
elaborate procedures for distributing the shares of the company, and so forth. 
Now we are not only talking about the telephone company, but about the 
whole economy, the whole steel industry, the entire construction industry, 
automobiles, whatever you may think of as typical industrial processes. 
So it is natural to say, "Look, this cannot happen at once; we want a 
carefully, time-phased procedure." But there is a serious problem. I think the 
problem has not yet quite been addressed, and that is the question of 
credibility. In order to proceed to privatization, you want a situation whereby 
it is guaranteed that this is a process which will end with a major portion of 
the industry turned into private hands. You do not want situations in which 
the process can be reversed in the middle, because purchasers want the 
assurance that their purchases can not be taken away from them. Otherwise, 
you will have an enterprise in private hands but with the fear that it will not 
be in thehandsof the present owners. And obviously theowners will not want 
to make investments, but will try to exploit the existing assets and run them 
down as quickly as they possibly can. These policies may cause certain 
increases in the output of the economy for a short period, but in not too long 
a period will lead to a diminution in national output. So the question of 
credibility must underlie all of these processes. 
Let me now turn to marketization. I take it for granted that a system which 
uses prices to allocate resources depends on having the prices flexible, 
responding to market conditions. Prices may be very, very detailed. You will 
have different varieties of the same good, and the prices should reflect both 
their costs and their utilities. We all understand the economic case for prices 
as a way of determining allocation: this means you want a balance between 
supply and demand, you want prices to more or less reflect costs, you want 
prices to go up to induce the inyestment which will create the supply which 
will meet the unexpected demand, and so forth... All the usual conditions of 
a free market economy. 
You have, at present, a system in which allocations are made more or less 
in real terms. A system that a lot of work has gone into, in which there is a 
large apparatus devoted to its performance, and in which prices play, I will 
not say no role, but a very secondary one. A steel firm says that it needs coal, 
it sends a request to the Gosplan, and the Gosplan works through the minis-
tries. The Ministry of Steel tells the Gosplan, which tells the Ministry of Coal 
or the Ministry of Mining what they need, and then instructions are issued 
from the Ministry of Mining to such and such coal mine to deliver. 
Obviously, a lot of things go wrong in that system; the coal mine may not 
deliver in fact, there are shortages, and all sortsofthings can happen. Actually, 
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and find where there is coal available; so the informal links may supplement, 
and in some cases very much supplant, the formal ones. But the formal links 
are very well worked out and do play a decisive role. If the coal mine cannot 
deliver, there will be great pressure to do so. Well, that is a very different form 
of system from one with a price system, where the steel company would buy 
the coal directly, face to face, from the coal company. Obviously, when quality 
and varieties matter, there is a tremendous inefficiency to roundabout com-
munication. People are not going to know what exactly is required. You get 
delivery of goods that are not quite right; there are a lot of costs to it. That is 
at the micro level but, more fundamentally, the fact that they do not have to 
respond to prices means there is no guarantee that the goods go to the place 
which can use them the most. 
Now the question is: How do you proceed to go from this allocation 
system in real terms to a price-motivated system? This problem, by the way, 
is not entirely related to the question of privatization. Indeed, it has been the 
program advocated by many socialists for a long time. Ideas like these were 
being circulated, actually, by such Italian economists as Vilfredo Pareto and 
Enrico Barone before the First World War, more as a theoretical exercise than 
out of actual interest. Later, after the First World War, when socialism became 
more of a reality, there was a great deal of discussion, some, like Lud wig von 
Mises, asserting the impossibility of a socialist system, and others asserting 
that, yes, the socialist system could do very well by using a price system, that 
socialist firms would trade with each other. During the period when socialism 
was dominant in Eastern Europe, some socialist economists repeatedly urged 
replacing the command system with a price system. It did not happen, and I 
think the time for market socialism has, as an ideal, irretrievably passed, but 
I will say I think it is very likely to have a role in the transition. 
Now, what do we do with the price system? Even if you have not 
completely privatized the economy, should you immediately go to a price 
system? Flexible prices, prices set by the firms themselves, profits retained by 
the firms, and all the rest of that. How do you manage this? Well, one view is 
that one day, you simply announce that there are no more price controls; you 
just have no price controls at all, and let the firms set the prices. Assuming for 
the moment the markets work well, prices will change and have very little 
resemblance to present prices. Expectations that have been built up on the 
basis of previous relationships will be destroyed. Thus, there is a theoretical 
argument for a time-phased change in prices: leave prices of certain consumer 
goods alone, and gradually change producer prices, presuming the producers 
are more sophisticated and can make quicker changes. 
It has been assumed that the prices would change to the true equilibrium 
levels instantaneously. We do know that prices in markets of the free 
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The price of oil probably varies more on the spot market than can be credibly 
assigned to any reasonable set of expectations, for example. The stock market 
similarly shows certain instabilities. In a situation where the change in prices 
needed is not a small change, not a local change, but a very large one, it can 
be expected to take quite a while. In this procedure, it may be a very good idea 
to put some limits on the rate at which prices change, letting them go by steps 
to their true cost basis, for example. 
I think the argument is a very good one, but it is a problem which must 
be addressed in terms of credibility. If you say we are going to shield these 
sets of prices, and then you start changing others, perhaps these consumer 
goods will turn out to be unprofitable or excessively profitable at these fixed 
sets of prices. Then there will be pressures to change them, but meanwhile 
there will be vested interests involved. The producers will be strongly inter-
ested in maintaining high prices, but not the consumers. If you think of this 
as a guided process, with somebody controlling the decontrol, you are going 
to have pressures to change the decontrol, to modify it; and then, of course, if 
it is known that there are all of these pressures, there will be incentives to play 
various games, to pretend things are more costly than they really are. There 
will be pressures of all kinds to make profits by political protection rather than 
by economic competition. 
There is another problem, by the way, in the transition from an allocation 
system to a price system, namely that the socialist systems have, after all, been 
organized on the basis of monopolies, as a Ministry of Steel, a Ministry of 
Construction, or a Ministry of I do not know; and it will be necessary, in the 
process of transition, to create competition. It will be necessary to break up 
the units into smaller units able to compete with each other successfully. But 
this is a non-trivial task. The managers that have worked together in the past 
will find it very convenient to continue working together. This is one of the 
dichotomies we have to face. It strongly suggests to me that the Big-Bang 
approach of free decontrol may be a better one, in spite of some of the 
difficulties it is going to create. 
The problem of prices is, from a theoretical point of view at least, an easier 
problem than the one of privatization. The first very simple problem of 
privatization is: Where are the buyers? After all, you have a country in which 
capital is owned by the State. Not all of it; for example, it is true that private 
savers hold considerable liquid balances. In fact, these are feared on the 
grounds that as consumer goods come on the market, and people choose to 
spend these balances, there will be an inflationary pressure. But, nevertheless, 
if you think of this as a source of assets to buy the productive equipment of 
society, it is trivial; it is much too small by an order of magnitude, by factors 
of a tenth, or probably by factors of a hundredth. 
So, who is going to buy the capital? Well, there has been a fair amount of TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM 11 
discussion, specially in Poland, whicn is the only country that has actually 
made some serious steps toward changing the system. All the others are just 
talking. The first idea of the Poles was to have accounting firms value each 
existing firm, to set a fair price at which it can be bought. You issue shares, 
and then individual buyers will buy the shares at a price. In the first place, 
that turns out to be an impossible situation, because you cannot value firms 
in any credible way. For the same firm, with different expectations of the 
future, you can get differences in value of the order of ten times from one 
estimate to another. 
Another proposal to set fair prices is to use an auction procedure. We will 
now just issue shares and people can buy them. But as I have said, who are 
the buyers? If you depend on existing assets, a firm will sell at a ludicrously 
low level, certainly on the assumption that you want to privatize relatively 
quickly. I think that to privatize in a fairly short period of time, say in a few 
years, and at the same time proceed to try to achieve something like a fair 
value for the assets is impossible. That is not a solution; it is virtually a question 
of mere arithmetic, there is no possible way to achieve it. 
One possibility is to sell them very slowly, over a long period of time. The 
idea then is that you have some part of the economy which is private; capital 
will be accumulating in that sector, which gradually can be used to buy assets 
from the State over a long period. That is not an incred ible proposition. It does, 
however, run across the question of credibility; the Government's commit-
ment to privatize gradually has to be very well believed by the people. 
There is another idea which, I must say, I thought was not very politically 
likely, but I now think has some advantages. And that is essentially privatiz-
ing by giving the enterprises away. It may sound very funny, but there are 
ways of doing it that make some sense. One way that has been proposed in 
both Poland and the Soviet Union is to create a kind of special currency, a 
voucher system, for buying public enterprises. Shares will be offered in these 
various firms, and people will bid for these shares; they can use money also, 
but particularly they can use vouchers. These vouchers, of course, once 
received by the State, will be retired, because if you alter the money supply 
you have a terrible problem. It is not illogical because, after all, who owns the 
enterprises now? You can say the State does, but the State is an abstraction. 
The State, in a sense, stands for the people. Giving them to the people should, 
from an ethical or distributional point of view, be as good as giving the 
proceeds to the State, in fact it may be better. It will tend to preserve equality 
in income in a better way than giving it to the State, because you do not know 
what the State will do with it. 
I leave aside here the question of foreign buyers. Let me just say that there 
are two problems with foreign purchases. In the first place, the amount of 
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going to be very great when you take it in proportion to something the size of 
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, you are talking about a very turbulent period 
with a great deal of uncertainty, and rational foreign investors are going to be 
reluctant to invest. Of course, you have the international lending agencies that 
no doubt will play a very useful role, but the aggregate investment from them 
is not really big, maybe 5% of the total capital value in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. 
The second thing, of course, is that if foreign investors come into a 
situation where, let us say, the enterprises are going very cheaply, in terms of 
their long-run value, after a few years there will be political resentment against 
an excessive amount of foreign investment; it will be seen as taking advantage 
of the situation. So I think, for all these reasons, that although foreign invest-
ment will play a role, its biggest implication will be the transmission of 
technology from the West to the East, and that it will not play a large role in 
terms of the amount of capital. 
So the vouchers system is a possibility. Theoretically, it has a lot of good 
features about it. I was actually with a mission in the Soviet Union for one of 
the international lending agencies. In our discussions with those economists 
who were closer to the real decisions, they were quite impatient of any ideas 
about vouchers. They said: that is gimmickry, that is not a real proposal, it is 
the sort of thing that armchair economists think about. Now sometimes 
armchair economists have the last word when it comes to practical ideas, but 
at the moment I think we have to contemplate the notion that wo will not have 
distributions with the voucher system. 
If we do not have a voucher system, then, as I have already suggested, 
what you have to have is a slow privatization. Start privatizing those in-
dustries in which the capital component is small, where essentially human 
capital, rather than physical capital, is dominant. I am thinking primarily of 
the service industries and the distribution network. The capital that will 
accumulate in this sector can eventually buy the more capital-intensive in-
dustries that will have been under State ownership for a while. 
To get the benefit of a free enterprise system in a socialist context, one has 
to break up the publicly owned enterprises into self-contained units in which 
we have a clear-cut sense of property. Enterprises which are on their own can 
get no subsidies, they can get no help from the State; they can borrow money, 
but only from banks that are concerned about the repayments. The Hungarian 
economist Janos Kornai has emphasized that the overriding failure of the 
socialist systems is what he calls a soft-budget constraint. The firms are not 
actually forced to break even; if the firm does badly, it will likely get an allocation 
of money from the central government to make up for it. What you have to do 
is harden the budget constraint. The firm has to be on its own, own the property, 
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in the first instance to the company, and if the profits are negative, the company 
goes out of business after a while. That is the only strategy by means of which 
the idea of a slow transition to privatization can take place. 
Now, there is a problem with both strategies, and that is who is going to 
handle the transition in particular industries? The natural people are the 
present managers. A very strong and correct perception exists in the sense 
thatthercis a tremendous amount of inefficiency in the socialist systems. And 
who is responsible for this inefficiency? Well, to some extent, the present 
managers. The problem I am talking about here applies to that, sector of the 
industry which is relatively large, that have plants of some considerable size. 
It does not apply to situations in which management is very closely linked 
with the work force; when you have a corner grocery store, that is not the kind 
of problem I am talking about. I am talking about situations where you have 
a relatively large work force, maybe a hundred or a thousand employees. You 
must remember, by the way, that socialist firms average many more 
employees than capitalist firms. That is true not only in the Soviet Union, but 
in other socialist countries. 
So you have a situation in which the ownership is going to be diffused 
among a significantly large number of stockholders; the firms are too big to 
have single owners, especially when there are no people with accumulated 
capital. The result is going to be what we have in large firms in the United 
States: managerial control. Now, ultimately managers do have to meet the 
market test. A manager will not stay if he is really losing money conspicuous-
ly, but until you get into a bad stage, this is not going to be important. As far 
as I can see, this argument is true both in the voucher system and in transitory 
state ownership, because in both cases the managers are not going to have 
anybody who has effective control over them. In fact, I would be inclined to 
think that State ownership might be better, because you have a concentrated 
owner who might really care about the outcome and be prepared to get rid of 
an inefficient manager. I do not see how managerial inefficiency can be 
avoided in these situations, because I do not see how you can get rid of the 
managers. 
Another problem, by the way, is that managers will be in an excellent 
position to benefit from the trade, and I am sure they are doing so right now 
in quite large amounts. You may say that is a price to be paid for the transition, 
and there is nothing much to be done about it. From the efficiency point of 
view this might not be serious; it would be serious from the point of view of 
the just distribution of income. And maybe that is one of the prices one has to 
pay. What I mean is this: If the managers are handling how the firms are 
transferred from part of a State Ministry to a separate self-stand ing enterprise, 
they are likely to somehow arrange that to theirbenefit. They have superiority 
of inside information, and the chances are that they are going to be able to 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
benefit one way or another: guaranteed positions, higher salaries, having 
some of the shares issued to them, using various techniques, not all of them 
unknown in private enterprises, by the way. So I think this is a problem we 
ought to face. 
Now, everybody agrees that one of the problems in developing these steps 
of privatization and marketization is macroeconomic balance. There is a great 
fear of inflation in all these countries. Inflation is being held down basically as a 
result of the controlled economy, and as the liberalization occurs there will be 
sharply rising prices as now in Poland. There is the view of the monetary 
overhang, that I have mentioned before. One suggestion is to use the privatiza-
tion to offset the overhang. It strikes me, and I have not seen it discussed very 
much, that there is a certain intermediate phase here, when you think of 
privatizing housing and possibly farming. Especially in the Soviet Union, 
farming is predominantly socialist. In the other socialist countries there is a 
considerable fraction of private farms (in Poland most of the farms are private 
already, in Hungary the situation is mixed). So, just privatizing farmland and 
housing alone would probably be far more than enough to absorb the monetary 
overhang. It seems to me that this is an important complementary tool. 
You also need reforms of certain basic institutions, institutions so basic that 
you do not realize you need them, until you see another system. One of them is 
accounting. It turns out that accounting in the Soviet Union is essentially a way 
of checking to make sure that people do not steal money, it is cash-flow 
accounting. For that purpose that is perfectly all right, but in a situation where 
you really ought to know the economic value of what you are doing, you need 
to go to a somewhat more sophisticated level of accrual accounting. And this is 
really more or less unknown, as the Soviet planners will tell you so. There are 
simply no trained accountants, there is no idea of cost properly interpreted (you 
do not want to charge all of your capital in the first year you require it, for 
example). Most economists think that Western accounting methods are very 
primitive when it comes to allocating costs, that you need much more sophis-
tication than now exists, that cost accounting is too gross. But this is well on the 
other side of their problem. A movement towards a kind of accounting that we 
have in the West will be a considerable improvement, and it is interesting that 
this simple matter has not been defined. 
The other thing is property law. If we start creating self-standing firms, 
we have to have a definition of what they own and what they do not own. In 
an allocative system, ownership is not that important. If you need something 
for your firm, you go to your ministry and say, we need this; it is taken away 
from somebody else and is given to you. It is a coherent system; well, it is a 
mildly coherent system, it actually breaks down a lot in its own terms, but it 
is a system that makes some sense in its own terms. That system is being 
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system is being dismantled. With the present feeling that you can disobey 
laws, the firms do not obey orders. 
So you need to move towards defining what is meant by property. You 
have got to say the firm comes equipped with the ownership over this but not 
with the ownership of that. If you want the ownership over this other thing, 
you have to buy it. If you need coal, if you need better lighting, if you need 
communications, which is a very serious lack in the Soviet Union, you have 
to pay for it, it is not given to you a priori. That is so elementary that you do 
not want to discuss it. But the idea that you need a property law was accepted 
in the Soviet Union five years ago, and nothing has been done about it. The 
same thing happens in China, by the way, exactly the same discussion of the 
importance of property laws occurs among Chinese economists. Nobody 
really denies it; nevertheless, the implementation of it turns out to trod on so 
many people's toes that it is very difficult. 
Also, the tax system has to be completely revised. The basis of the Soviet 
tax system was theoretically a tax on profits from firms. But it was not really 
a tax system; that is to say, it was not based on rules. If a firm kept on doing 
well, the central government would increase its taxes. There was never any 
specification that it would take 30% or 40% or 50% of the profits and no more. 
It was ordered each time as needed. If a firm was doing badly, a firm would 
get permission to get its taxes cut. Well, one problem -and this is one of the 
things that has undermined all previous reform efforts- has been that there 
is obviously a tremendous disincentive to do anything. If a firm's efficiency 
is measured by profits, the profits that they retain, then you would like to 
know in advance: if you get an extra thousand rubles how much of that is 
going to stay with you. If you never know in advance, if you have no right to 
that additional income, let us say for reinvestment or for better conditions for 
the workers or any other thing you can think of, then there is no incentive. 
There had been a number of attempts at reforms in the Soviet Union. They 
never lasted, and one of the reasons was the point about credibility which I 
mentioned earlier. The statements from the Soviet authorities about what 
incentives they would provide were not credible; in fact, they violated them 
all of the time, making them clearly incredible. So the first thing about taxes 
is that it has to be a system; that is, it has to be rule-based. 
A second requirement is that with the potential of inflation you have to 
arrange for fiscal balance. What they have now is that the tax system, or the 
lack of system, they had before is beginning to collapse; it is not so easy to 
collect taxes. The result is that there has been a large increasing deficit in the 
Soviet Union which has added greatly to liquid balances in the short run. You 
must have a tax system which is collecting the taxes, deal with the balance, 
and in fact, I will argue below, maybe a surplus is what is needed. And there 
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use of the tax system to achieve equality. I want to expand on it a little later. 
Let me state some background to thinking about the future of the 
socialist economy. One is the theoretical one I have mentioned before -not 
so much what the theory of a good socialist economy is, but rather why the 
reforms have not been adopted. There were Soviet economists who were 
publishing various papers showing how to rationally decide on new invest-
ment, for example. Even in the Soviet literature you find that, much more 
in some of the other socialist countries. Now, those countries did have ups 
and downs when it came to free political discussion, and it was not always 
possible to enunciate doctrines. There was a considerable literature in the 
sixties in Poland on liberalization; in 1968 there was a reaction, and as a 
result most of the liberal economists were driven abroad. Only in Hungary 
was there a fairly free discussion. But the interesting question, after all, is 
that if the decision makers, the communist party leaders, knew about these 
reforms, why did not they adopt them? I do not really have an answer to 
that question, but it has relevance to the issue of how the power is going to 
be transferred today. It is true that communist parties per se are losing all 
legitimacy, but the bureaucracy is still there, it has not been dismantled. 
And the question is, assuming as a model that it was bureaucratic interest 
that prevented reforms from taking place, what can you do with the large 
bureaucracy that is still there showing no signs of diminution, not only in 
the Soviet Union, but in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Also, there is an interesting question as to why the system was quite as 
inefficient as it was. For example, managers could have been dismissed or, in 
the case they did well, promoted to better positions. You would think that 
some of the inefficiencies which have been revealed now could have been 
avoided just by prudent management. They were not all under the control of 
the manager, a great deal had to do with the system, but some of these 
inefficiencies were at the firm level. From the published data (now published, 
it was not published until recently), you can calculate some things like 
incremental capital output ratios. That is to say, you take the additional capital 
from one year to the next and divide it by the change in output. These run in 
the Soviet Union, in the order of seven. A figure like that is huge by the 
standards of any other country; three would be considered a high number in 
most places. There were several years' inventories on hand. We expect inven-
tories in a reasonably efficient firm to turn over two or three times a year, and 
that is not by any means the most efficient firms; here they have several years' 
inventories on hand. Energy usage per unit of output is about double what it 
is in Western Europe. Now you would think that a management would have 
some incentive? under any system you can think, of no matter how poor to 
cut down its use of energy. Transportation has become a major bottleneck 
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Let me say something about the resource structure with which these 
economies are moving into the new economy. By most measures human 
capital is very high. The main measure is the degree of education, and if 
you take the average level of education in the socialist countries, it is high. 
There has been a consistent emphasis on the importance of education. I must 
say that among the many pledges of socialism, that seems to be one that 
was taken seriously. Probably some of you will say, yes, they have a lot of 
knowledge derived from books or techniques, but they have not learned to 
think for themselves. There is no entrepreneurial spirit; and so human 
capital may be misjudged with a measure like that. But still, that is an asset 
which certainly must be exploited in any change to a new economy. Physical 
capital, on the other hand, is probably much lower than the figures show, 
because most of this is ill-adapted. You have to rewrite the capital at its true 
value. Utilization is rather low in terms of the number of shifts, for example. 
Transportation, as I have said, is a bottleneck. Though it is possible that as 
you improve efficiency, say, through a better distribution system, you 
reduce the demand on transportation, and therefore make the present 
transportation system more usable. I will say that the quality of the rail 
system, I am told by the experts, is quite good. Highways, on the other hand, 
are something of a disaster. They are very poorly maintained, insufficient 
in quantity, and so forth. There is a very low ratio, by the way, of distribu-
tion services to output and this may be a sign of inefficiency. 
Now let me turn to few remarks on the role of the State. Basically what 
I am going to say is that the State role has to be minimized. The biggest 
problem is micro-management, the tendency of the system through its 
allocation program to tell individual firms what to do. It is clear that, by 
any standards you can think of, this is going to be a source of inefficiency. 
Information in any economic system that has any complexity is distributed 
unequally. If people were doing something, they have to know more about 
it than anybody else. For others to acquire that knowledge is very costly 
and inefficient. For other people to make decisions based on inadequate 
information, as they do, is even more inefficient. For example, you have this 
standard of setting output quotas for firms. Well, any firm will produce a 
great many goods; so you have an index number problem. Consider all 
those stories about setting quotas for nails. First you decide to set quotas in 
terms of tonnage. Well, it turns out it is much easier to produce a big nail 
than a little nail. So to get your tonnage figures up vou produce big nails. 
After a while the ministry realizes the mistake, and it switches to setting the 
number of nails. But obviously the input per nail is less for a small nail. So 
you produce a lot of small nails. Either way you do not meet the needs of 
the market, which after all should be the controlling factor. 
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aggregation. It will never be efficient under the best of circumstances, and 
the circumstances are certainly not the best. I think it is probably sure that 
micro-management can not be ended by telling the ministries not to do it. 
You have to keep this bureaucracy from existing. You cannot really make 
anything unimportant as long as it is there, and I think you have to make it 
non-existent. From this point of view, the tendency in the Soviet Union to 
devolve power into the republics is a good thing. It is a bad thing from a lot 
of other points of view, but this is one virtue along with its other problems. 
Presumably, the Russian Socialist Republic (or whatever they will call it, 
the Russian Republic, the Ukrainian Republic, and so forth) will not take 
over the old bureaucracies. So that devolution means that the union 
bureaucracy will have no place to go, and it might automatically wither 
away, if I may use Lenin's phrase on this occasion. 
There are other advantages to weakening the State. If you have a large 
State, you have a tendency to expect it to do something; politically speaking, 
if you are voting for people and they have power to do something, you will 
judge them on their performance. In a transition, and this may sound harsh, 
I think one of the worst things to do is to retain industries that are decaying. 
This is a problem in most countries, by the way. Shipbuilding in most of 
Europe was subsidized for a long period of time, after it was clearly inefficient 
and other countries were competing. In the same way, the Soviet Union has 
to allow industries that cannot stand foreign competition to disappear. You 
may talk about justice and equity and all that, and I think these are very 
important, but I do not think this is the way to achieve them. One of the reasons 
for the success of Sweden, which is a country that is very much devoted to 
egalitarian ideas, is that theydid notuse their egalitarianism to preservedying 
industries. There was a strong tendency to recognize dying industries, and set 
to meet them by retraining workers and the like in the labor movement. So 
this is genuine egalitarianism, as opposed to what I think is a false idea of 
retaining existing jobs. 
In the same way, regional policies, policies to protect particular regions, are 
probably a bad idea at this stage of the game. If you have a weak State you will 
not be tempted to carry out these ideas. I want to mention a very interesting 
discussion by Professor Laura Tyson at the University of California at Berkeley, 
on the Yugoslav movement to self-management about 25 years ago. She says 
that one of the real reasons for that was not so much to improve efficiency, which 
was the official argument, but that if each factory was on its own, it was its 
responsibility to succeed or fail. Now, Yugoslavia is a country with very sharp 
regional differences in income. There are very prosperous areas (there always 
have been; this does not have to do with socialist regimes, but rather with the 
history of the country), and other areas which are very poor. If you go from 
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socialist state justify inequalities? Their job was to abolish them, but they did not 
know how to do it and they could not do it. So by transferring the responsibility 
to the workers, the government was absolved of its blame for income inequality. 
In the same way, I think a very important thing about weakening the State is 
that responsibilities of this kind will be given less prominence. In the drive for 
efficiency and growth, these policies have to be dispensed with. Besides, it is my 
impression that most regional policies have not been very successful in fact. We 
had them in the United States, very unsuccessfully; they had them in Great 
Britain, considerably more extensively, but they have not in fact improved the 
backward areas. 
Let me turn to some specific problems of the economy. One that is very 
much to be concerned about is transitional unemployment. Essentially, the 
Soviet Union and other socialist states did have the commitment to full 
employment. It was maintained, if necessary, by keeping workers on jobs 
where there was no job. Firms were not free to easily dismiss workers and, of 
course, the counterpart was that workers did not find it easy to switch jobs; 
this went both ways. Any system in which you are making each firm respon-
sible for its own activities, along the lines that everybody has been advocating, 
has to recognize that some firms will do badly and some will do well. And 
firms that do well, may do well by dismissing half of their work force. They 
will do well by being more efficient, and efficiency means reducing inputs 
including, in particular, the labor input, and this process leads to unemploy-
ment. We expect it to be transient, we expect this to lead to an expansion in 
which workers will be reabsorbed with a larger scale of output, but certainly 
the problem will exist for a period of time. Even in East Germany, which is by 
far the most favorable possible case, since it has a very wealthy and loving 
brother, unemployment is expected to rise to 30%. I think one has to have what 
are sometimes called active unemployment policies, retraining, very good 
employment exchanges, as methods of improving the transition. There is 
statistical evidence that, in Western Europe, these have been rather effective. 
From a cross-country comparison, Sweden, which has a very active policy, 
keeps unemployment rates low other things being equal I think on the other 
hand that while you want an'active policy you also want very generous 
benefits. As a matter of justice, the people being unemployed are not the ones 
who are responsible for the inefficiency. It is a matter of justice it is a matter 
of nreservine social ceace So I think vou need both generous unemolovment 
benefits and active oolicies but vou nrobablv would not want for examnle 
minimum wages (oVat least be very cautious on minimum wages) and 
certainly as I said before no regional policies 
In the Soviet Union, and I believe this is true for the rest of Eastern Europe, 
service industries need expansion. This is not the characteristic of Third World 
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consequences of Marxism was a bias towards measuring things in terms of 
material production and ignoring the economic value of services. This is one 
case where the ideology seems to have a permanent effect. I think that the lack 
of an adequate distribution system is creating palpable inefficiencies. They 
hope for some better distribution system to reduce inventories, and I hope 
that, over a period of time, as the distribution system gets better, they will also 
have a reduction in the size of the plants. Large plants imply large transpor-
tation costs, since production is concentrated in fewer places and you have 
higher transportation costs. That is one of the reasons why large plants are 
socially inefficient. 
The third problem that people mention is the distribution of income. 
From the data published in the Eastern bloc on income distribution, particular-
ly in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, one of the things that socialism 
has achieved is a more equal distribution of income in the Eastern Europe 
countries than is achieved in Great Britain, for example, or the United States, 
and probably more than France or Germany; even more than Sweden, as a 
matter of fact, although it appears to be much closer. 
I think in this period of great change there is no reason to assume that 
this will be maintained. It is true that most historical facts change slowly, and 
since you start from a highly equal income distribution, you might suppose 
it will take some time. But what has happened is that this equality was 
achieved by a compression of the wage scale, doctors' wages are of the order 
of low-skilled workers' wages, and that sort of thing. We cannot assume that 
when you move to a competitive world this will be maintained, and probably 
it should not be maintained for efficiency reasons. There will be wage d if feren-
tiation, there will be profits earned, there will be the inside managers that I 
have spoken of before with their special advantages, and so forth. 
This is going to be a problem. Income distribution will probably change 
for the worse. It is possible that the tax system can be used, as in Sweden, to 
mitigate these changes; but there are a lot of burdens to be put on the brand 
new tax, and it may not also be able to serve egalitarian functions. So I am a 
little pessimistic on that one. 
Finally, I stressed the problem of where the capital is going to come from 
to buy an existing plant. But, looking ahead, we have the problem of financing 
investment; where is the source of investment? There is private savings to be 
sure, and we do not know what is going to happen as more goods become 
available. The government has been, after all, a characteristic saver; by taking 
taxes from the prosperous firms, this has been a source of investment. That 
has to stop; it is a very inefficient way of generating investment. Of course, 
there are retained profits. As time goes on, the firms do retain profits and 
invest in their own activities. Maybe the firms will be very successful in paying 
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(banks are emerging in the Soviet Union), and thebanks will then be the source 
of investment. But I think that in the beginning you will need more invest-
ment, particularly as you write off the old capital goods; remember that I 
suggested that they were ill-adapted. They need new capital goods, and a lot 
of investment to improve productivity in the near future, and probably the 
only way to generate the savings will be through a budgetary surplus, which 
puts more saving in private hands. I wonder if that may be difficult, since the 
problem at the moment is thought to be just the opposite, to reduce the deficit, 
and I am asking for more. 
Well, I think I have sketched what I consider some of the main problems 
in the transition from socialism to some kind of private enterprise economy. 
There are a lot more. I have not exhausted the topic, I can assure you, but I 
think this is enough complication for now. Let me just revert to my specula-
tions and broad views at the beginning of the meeting: the future of the 
nation-state in the economic sphere. What is happening is a phenomenon 
which I think is not easy to explain, but that certainly is a fact. International 
trade is really swallowing up national economic sovereignty. For some reason, 
and I am not sure we have a good theoretical explanation, international trade 
has become a much more marked feature of the economic world than ever 
before. The percentagein theUnited States is two and a half times what it used 
to be, and in every other country is the same. 
I believe that one of the reasons why the socialist world got into its crisis 
is that it was so linked to the Western world that the slowdown in the 
economic activity that the Western world has had for the last 15 years (it is 
beginning to emerge from it now) had its effects on the East. Export oppor-
tunities for the East diminished, as the growing days of the 1960s were 
replaced by the rather stagnant days after 1973. This showed up, by the way, 
specially in the debt crises for Poland and Hungary. 
In the days of Stalin these problems did not exist. There was a limited 
amount of trade with the Western world. It was done not by the firms 
involved, but through a special trading company. They were selling natural 
resources, which tended to have demands that would depend on the business 
conditions, and they would expand the exports if the price fell. There was no 
real economic calculation. But as the economy became more complex, as the 
need for interaction with the West became greater, they could not avoid 
becoming so much more dependent on the West. That is a major factor in the 
negative judgement of socialism by the people. So even some of the autarkic 
Eastern bloc could not really escape the influence of world trade. 
Part of the reason is that technological transmission seems to be closely 
associated with foreign trade. A way of learning about newer technologies is to 
import them for a while, get the engineers and so forth, and this leads to a 
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off from the West. And I think they have found, as the Western countries have 
found, that their autonomy in economic affairs has greatly diminished. 
We see this, for example, in fiscal policy. In the early post-war period, 
fiscal policy, under Keynesian influence, was devoted to stabilizing the 
economy; and the record of the 1960s looks very good by the way. But now it 
does not work nearly as well, because the economies are more open. Spending 
at home may lead to a much bigger leakage, you may remember the old 
Keynesian terminology; that is to say, more would go abroad, and would not 
in fact help the country as much. That is why the idea developed of global 
Keynesianism, called the locomotive theory of coordination, where the lead-
ing Western states will agree on their fiscal policies. Well, they never managed 
to do it; it never worked in practice. The argument was to replace the country 
with the world as a unit of analysis, but that is not possible. 
So it looks as though countries have a much weaker ability to administer 
their own affairs. This raises a deep question: Given a world in which 
international trade plays a controlling role, is there any system, other than free 
enterprise, which is compatible with that fact? This is not even a question of 
what is desirable. Is it possible to have strong, nationally-run economies in 
the world of international trade? Thank you. 